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An Economic Model of Mortality Salience in
Personal Financial Decision Making:
Applications to Annuities, Life Insurance,
Charitable Gifts, Estate Planning, Conspicuous
Consumption, and Healthcare
Russell N. James, III
Texas Tech University
The study of personal mortality salience and the denial of death have a long history in
psychology leading to the modern field of Terror Management Theory. However, a simple
consumer utility function predicts many of the outcomes identified in experimental research
in this field. Further, this economic approach explains a range of otherwise unexpected
financial decision-making behaviors in areas as diverse as annuities, life insurance, charitable
gifts and bequests, intra-family gifts and bequests, conspicuous consumption, and healthcare.
With its relevance to such a wide range of personal financial decisions, understanding the
impact of mortality salience can be particularly useful to advisors in related fields.
Keywords: mortality salience; terror management theory; annuities; life insurance; charitable
gifts; healthcare
“I intend to live forever. So far, so good.”
– Comedian Steven Wright
INTRODUCTION
A long history of work in psychology – beginning with Otto Rank (1941/2011),
popularized by Ernest Becker (1973), and experimentally tested for decades by modern
researchers (Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010) – called Terror Management Theory (TMT)
suggests that humans treat personal mortality awareness far differently than other types of
objective information. This paper proposes that a simple consumer utility function
predicts many behaviors identified in TMT experimental research and provides insight into
a wide range of otherwise perplexing behaviors with relevance to financial decision
making. Understanding the sometimes unexpected implications of the model for financial
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decisions involving contemplation of personal mortality can generate practically useful
strategies for advisors seeking to understand and assist clients in advancing personal and
family well-being.
MORTALITY SALIENCE IN PSYCHOLOGY
Originally rooted in complex notions of post-Freudian psychoanalysis, TMT suggests
that the awareness of impending death creates anxiety or “terror,” and the central task of
various psychological constructs is to manage this fear (Becker, 1973; Rank, 1941/2011).
A modern extension of these concepts holds that personal mortality salience generates two
types of defenses: first, avoidance, and second, pursuit of symbolic immortality
(Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999).
Initial Avoidance
In general, people express an aversion to focusing on their own death. In a standard
work on the psychology of death, Kastenbaum (2000, p. 98) explains that there is “general
agreement that most of us prefer to minimize even our cognitive encounters with death.”
Avoiding personal mortality related thoughts can be accomplished in a number of ways
such as distraction (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 1994), active
suppression (Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Simon, 1997), or biasing
estimates of vulnerability (Greenberg, Arndt, Simon, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 2000).
Induced Avoidance
Beyond this general tendency towards avoidance, experimentally-induced mortality
reminders actually increase subsequent tendencies to suppress death-related interactions
(Arndt et al., 1997; Greenberg et al., 2000). For example, experimentally-induced mortality
reminders lead to increased denial of personal characteristics said to result in early death
(Greenberg et al., 2000).
Symbolic Immortality
Avoidance, however, is not a complete solution to managing the fear of death
because the inevitable reality of mortality persists. As a second defense, people may engage
in the pursuit of symbolic immortality. Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Solomon (1999)
explained, “the hope of symbolic immortality is provided by enabling individuals to feel a
part of something larger, more powerful, and more eternal than themselves, such as the
family, church, nation, corporation, or other enduring social entities” (p. 836). Although the
person will die, some impact will live on through one’s surviving in-group, making the
support and maintenance of the in-group particularly important.
Accordingly, mortality salience increases the desire to be remembered by and to
support one’s surviving in-group members, and to oppose surviving out-group members.
The increased desire for remembrance can be seen in that mortality reminders increase the
desire for fame (Greenberg, Kosloff, Solomon, Cohen, & Landau, 2010), the perception of
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one’s past significance (Landau, Greenberg, & Sullivan, 2009), and even the interest in
naming a star after one’s self (Greenberg et al., 2010). Increased willingness to support
one’s in-groups, and resist out-groups, can be seen in the effect of mortality reminders on
increasing negative ratings by Americans of anti-US essays (Burke et al., 2010), increasing
German preference for the German mark instead of the euro (Jonas, Fritsche, & Greenberg,
2005), increasing the predicted success of the national soccer team (Dechesne, Greenberg,
Arndt, & Schimel, 2000), increasing negative ratings of foreign candy (Friese & Hoffmann,
2008), and increasing support for more nationalistic political figures (Burke et al., 2010).
Although these core TMT principles do not cover the wide range of complexities,
causes, and implications found in the field, they represent important points of agreement
well supported by experimental results. The next section demonstrates how similar
principles, as well as others, arise from an economic approach using a simple consumer
utility function.
AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF CONSUMPTION WITH DEATH DENIAL
Definition of the Economic Model
Following Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), consumers maximize expected wellbeing, defined both by current circumstances and by expectations regarding future
circumstance at each period. The inclusion of expectations of the future as an independent
source of current well-being leads to a divergence between optimal expectations and
rational expectations. Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) explained, “optimal beliefs trade
off the incentive to be optimistic in order to increase expected future utility against the
costs of poor outcomes that result from decisions made based on optimistic beliefs” (p.
1096).
In the simplest model incorporating anticipatory utility, the consumer in a two
period game seeks to maximize felicity, W, where c1 is current consumption, δ is the
discount function for anticipatory utility from subjectively estimated future consumption,
ĉ2, and β is the discount function for actual future consumption, c2. As a simple illustration,
the purchase of a new pair of designer shoes can contribute to felicity because the
consumer can immediately wear them, u(c1), can immediately enjoy the anticipation of
wearing them at an important future event, δu(ĉ2), and later can enjoy actually wearing
them at the future event, βu(c2).
W = u(c1) + δu(ĉ 2) + βu(c2)
Next, following Gary Becker (1974), utility is affected not only by personal
consumption, c, but also by the circumstances of others, R. This utility from the
circumstances of those in one’s social environment, R, may represent either positive
interdependence, as with a loved one, or negative interdependence, as with an enemy.
Because future personal consumption is contingent on the consumer’s survival to the
future period, s [0,1], anticipatory utility from future personal consumption is contingent
on the consumer’s subjective beliefs regarding survival to the future period, ŝ [0,1]. In
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contrast, the consumer may gain anticipatory utility from the future circumstances of
others, R2, even in a condition where the consumer will not survive to the future period.
Although the consumer who does not survive will be unable to personally observe and
appreciate the circumstances of others during the future period, the consumer can still gain
anticipatory utility from his or her impact upon those future circumstances. In this
approach, the only element of uncertainty subject to optimism is the consumer’s subjective
estimation of the probability of survival, ŝ, which may differ from an objective survival
estimate, s, by incorporating death denial, d [0,1]. Thus, in this expanded form, the
consumer seeks to maximize.
W = u(c1, R1) + δu(ĉ 2, R2) + sβu(c2, R2), where ĉ 2 = ŝ *c2 and ŝ = s + d*(1-s)
To return to the simple illustration, in the expanded model the consumer can also
receive felicity by giving a new pair of designer shoes to a friend from the friend’s
immediate use of the shoes, u(R1), from the immediate contemplation of the friend’s use of
the shoes at an important future event, δu(R2), and later from actually observing the friend
wearing the shoes at the future event, sβu(R2). Additionally, the expanded model
incorporates the objective, s, and subjective, ŝ, likelihood that the consumer will survive to
the future event. As before, the consumer may purchase a pair of shoes for his or her own
use and immediately enjoy the anticipation of wearing them at an important future event.
But now, that enjoyment, δu(ĉ 2), depends upon the consumer’s subjective estimate of the
likelihood of surviving to the future event, ĉ 2 = ŝ*c2. In contrast, enjoyment from the
immediate anticipation of the friend’s use of the shoes at the future event, δu(R2), is not
dependent upon the consumer’s survival.
Anticipatory utility is assumed to be non-decreasing in inputs and subject to
diminishing marginal utility separately for anticipatory utility from expected future
consumption, u′(ĉ2)>0 & u′′(ĉ2)<0, anticipatory utility from expected future circumstances
of others, u′(R2)>0 & u′′(R2)<0, and combined as total anticipatory utility, resulting in
negative cross-partials, ∂u′(ĉ2)/∂R2<0 & ∂u′(R2)/∂ĉ<0.
Finally, developing and maintaining a bias, such as death denial, is not costless but
requires effort. Thus, an exogenous personal mortality reminder could reduce the death
denial bias, consequently requiring additional investments to rebuild the bias to the prereminder level. The consumer is constrained by a budget, B, that can be used to purchase a
vector of market or self-produced goods and services, X. These expenditures can influence
current personal consumption, Xc1, current circumstances of others, XR1, future
circumstances of others, XR2, future personal consumption if the consumer survives, Xc2,
objective survival probability, Xs, or help to bias or ignore estimates of the consumer’s
survival probability, Xd. As in Lancaster (1966), goods are inputs in which the output is a
collection of characteristics, and utility comes from these characteristics. Thus, a single
good or service may have multiple impacts in each of these categories of characteristics.
Although such characteristics may be bundled within a specific good, prices pc1, pc2, ps, pd,
pR1, and pR2, reflect the latent unbundled price structure, assumed to be non-decreasing, for
each separate characteristic type via current efforts and expenditures.
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B = pc1Xc1+pc2Xc2+psXs+pdXd+pR1XR1+pR2XR2
Current personal consumption, c1, includes the vector of characteristics of goods
and services both from current period purchases, Xc1, and from all sources outside of
current purchases (e.g., pre-existing capital assets or public goods). The same concept
applies to all other budget elements. For example, the current, R1, or anticipated future, R2,
circumstances of all others includes those generated by the consumer’s expenditures, XR1
or XR2, and those existing outside of such expenditures. The objectively estimated
probability of survival, s, consists of current expenditures affecting longevity, Xs, and
mortality-related circumstances outside of such expenditures. The consumer’s level of
death denial, d, is influenced by current efforts affecting death denial, Xd, and death denial
circumstances outside of such efforts. As with any maximizing consumption decision, at
equilibrium, the marginal utility from spending on any inputs will be equal for all inputs
with a positive investment.
Discussion of the Economic Model
Kopczuk and Slemrod (2005) presented the only previous economic model
explicitly incorporating death denial, explaining “we argue that anxiety associated with
thinking about death may in some circumstances lead people to repress, or deny, news
about their mortality” (p. 2). The current approach differs from Kopczuk and Slemrod’s
(2005) model in several ways, including incorporating the consumer’s social environment,
R1 and R2, and removing the requirement for an a priori assumption that death
contemplation must cause anxiety (although allowing that such a reaction would be likely).
Death denial need not mean that a consumer is unable to estimate accurate survival
probabilities, only that he or she does not always apply such estimates in specific
consumption decisions when optimism is the felicity-maximizing subjective expectation for
that decision. The idea that people routinely apply rosier predictions about their own
future than is objectively warranted (i.e., “optimism bias”) is not new (Sharot, 2011), nor is
an economic model that explicitly allows for information repression and self-deception in
support of these self-serving beliefs (Bénabou & Tirole, 2002). Similarly, the idea that
people can invest effort to increase their appreciation of a future event is not new to
economics (Becker & Mulligan, 1997; Böhm-Bawerk, 1891). Allowing death denial suggests
that by similar means a person may put forth effort to decrease appreciation of a specific
future event (i.e., his or her death).
The effort spent in biasing applied mortality estimates cannot be used for other
production or leisure activities, and thus is subject to a personal time and effort budget
constraint. As in previous approaches (Becker & Mulligan, 1997; Bénabou & Tirole, 2002),
such efforts may include laboring to enhance the vividness of optimistic imaginations,
purposeful information repression, and the active avoidance of undesirable reminders.
In addition to such personal efforts, spending money on certain goods or services
can aid in death denial. For example, quack medicine or placebo treatments often provide a
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plausible story, a convincing “expert,” and a community of followers, all of which may
facilitate biasing mortality estimates or avoiding death contemplation.
Derivation of TMT and Other Predictions from the Economic Model
As derived by Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), incorporating anticipatory utility
leads to optimism bias in predicting future circumstances. Where optimism regarding
future survival is optimally present (d>0), exogenously reducing this optimism, such as by
a morality salience reminder, lowers anticipated future period personal consumption by
reducing the survival estimate, ŝ, applied to future consumption. This reduces utility from
current period anticipation of future circumstances.1 Consequently, if re-establishing
optimism is costly (pd>0), the consumer will avoid engaging with mortality salient topics
that lower death denial unless there is an offsetting gain in objective longevity, s,
consumption, c1 or c2, or social environment, R1 or R2. This corresponds with “initial
avoidance” in TMT.
A shock that exogenously lowers death denial, d, lowers the subjective probability of
survival to the future period, ŝ, and thereby lowers subjectively estimated future
consumption ĉ2. Because the anticipatory utility from this subjectively estimated future
consumption, ĉ2, is subject to diminishing marginal utility, u′(ĉ2)>0, the immediate marginal
utility of ĉ2, and thus inputs d and s, will rise. However, this may not occur for the input of
future consumption, c2, as the drop in death denial itself, d, reduces the effectiveness of this
input in generating subjectively estimated future consumption, ĉ2, and hence in generating
anticipatory utility. Additionally, the diminishing marginal utility of overall combined
anticipatory utility, δu(ĉ 2, R2), also raises the immediate marginal utility of input R2 (this
from the negative cross-partial, ∂u′(R2)/∂ĉ < 0). Thus, the exogenous shock should increase
investments in pdXd, psXs, and/or pR2XR2 relative to investments in pc1Xc1, pc2Xc2, and pR1XR1.
The increased investment in pdXd corresponds with “induced avoidance” in TMT. The
increased investment in pR2XR2 corresponds with pursuit of “symbolic immortality”
(increased support for in-group members and resistance to out-group members) in TMT.
Beyond replicating these core predictions from TMT, this approach suggests
additional implications with regard to objective longevity, s. Because objective survival
probability, s, and death denial, d, are similar inputs to the subjective probability of
survival, ŝ, reducing the objective probability of survival, s, such as through aging or health
shocks, should have effects similar to experimental manipulations that reduce death denial,
d. As described above, such exogenous reductions in d (or s) would generate increased
investment in psXs, pdXd, and/or pR2XR2. The choice of which depends upon the relative cost
and effectiveness of each.

1 This still holds when survival contingent transfers of goods originally intended for c2, i.e., bequests,
are allowed. Such transfers result in lost utility whenever the desire for own future consumption, c2, differs
from the desire for future impact on another, R2. For example, another may inherit clothes purchased for the
consumer’s use, but this transfer will likely generate less anticipated utility than a comparable purchase
originally intended for the other’s future use.
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The increased marginal utility of R2 relative to c1, c2, or R1 would increase the
relative desire for future social impact as objective longevity falls. But, the relationship with
s and d is more complex. Death denial, d, and objective survival probability, s, are
substitutes that crowd each other out, ŝ = s+d*(1-s). At the extreme, a person with 100%
death denial would receive no anticipatory utility benefit from improving objective
longevity (e.g., via health-related investments or reducing risky behaviors). Conversely,
improvements to objective longevity generate the greatest anticipatory utility impact when
death denial does not exist. This trade-off is particularly important when pursuit of each is
mutually exclusive. For example, getting tested for a life-threatening disease or accepting
the mortality dangers of one’s risky behaviors would likely generate higher mortality
salience, thus lowering d, but could also increase objective longevity, s, due to early
detection or behavioral changes. A person who believes he or she can have little additional
impact on his or her health (i.e., perceives a high or unattainable marginal cost structure for
psXs) would be relatively more likely to invest in death denial, pdXd.
APPLICATIONS AND EXAMPLES
Annuities
Planning for retirement with a fixed sum of money presents a challenge in large part
because of statistical uncertainty about the duration of life. For example, about 20% of 65year olds in the U.S. will live fewer than ten years, but another 20% will live 25 or more
years (Lockwood, 2012). Economists have long held that the optimal solution involves the
purchase of annuities (Benartzi, Previtero, & Thaler, 2011; Yaari, 1965). Yet, consumers
rarely take advantage of this potentially optimal financial choice, with only about 3.6% of
recent retirees having purchased any life annuities (Lockwood, 2012). This behavioral
conundrum has been dubbed the “annuity puzzle” and explaining it “has proven so difficult
as to prompt a search for explanations outside the rational model” (Lockwood, 2012, p.
226).
If annuity contemplation generates increased personal mortality salience, and thus
potentially decreased death denial, the implications of the proposed model become
relevant. Given that an annuity involves an explicit bet on one’s own longevity, such an
effect is logical. Salisbury and Nenkov (2016) demonstrated this experimentally.
Participants rated either the likelihood that at age 65 they would put accumulated savings
into an IRA or the likelihood that at age 65 they would put accumulated savings into an
annuity. When asked to list the thoughts going through their mind during the decision, 1%
of those in the IRA condition spontaneously mentioned death-related thoughts, as
compared with 40% of those in the annuity condition.
By the initial avoidance implication, this mortality salience feature of annuities
would create consumer resistance. To test this causal link, Salisbury and Nenkov (2016)
varied the description of annuities to increase mortality salience by replacing “each year
you live” with “each year you live until you die”, and “if the annuity holder lives up to
different ages” with “depending on the age when the annuity holder dies” (p. 7). This
change increased mortality salience. A higher share of respondents reported death-related
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thoughts during the annuity decision process, including the death terms. Further, this
increase in death-related thoughts generated a lower interest in purchasing annuities.
Mediation analysis confirmed that the reduction in interest generated by the annuity
description change was fully mediated by the change in death-related thoughts (Salisbury
& Nenkov, 2016).
The induced avoidance implication suggests that other death reminders should make
annuities – themselves a reminder of mortality – even less attractive. Salisbury and Nenkov
(2016) also found this to be true. In a separate experiment, participants were randomly
assigned to write an essay about either dental pain or their own death before indicating
their interest in purchasing an annuity at age 65. Among those who first wrote about their
own death, only 23% expressed interest in purchasing an annuity at age 65, while 41% of
the comparison group did so.
The symbolic immortality implication suggests an additional reason for resistance to
a standard annuity. This implication holds that a death reminder, such as annuity
contemplation, should increase the relative desire for future social impact, R2. But, a
standard annuity protects lifetime consumption, c1 and c2, at the cost of a bequest transfer –
a form of future social impact - R2. Increasing bequest motivation will decrease interest in
standard annuities (Friedman & Warshawsky, 1990; Lockwood, 2012). This might also
explain why about three-fourths of all annuities owned by recent retirees actually contain
bequest benefits, or survivor benefits (Lockwood, 2012).
A contrary argument is that the presence of death denial should lead to excessive
annuity purchases, given optimistic estimations of longevity. However, because such
optimism is limited by objective impact on future outcomes, sβu(c2, R2), within the limited
context of this significant investment choice lowering death denial becomes maximizing,
thus preventing excessive purchases. After such a choice not to invest, however, the
consumer is left worse off, having lowered death denial below what is optimal outside of
the limited context of this significant investment choice. Thus, the maximizing approach is
to avoid or postpone contemplation of the annuity purchase altogether.
Life Insurance
The purchase of life insurance represents another behavioral “puzzle.” Relative to
their risk exposure, older adults tend to be over-insured, while younger families tend to be
under-insured (Chambers, Schlagenhauf, & Young, 2011). Based on standard consumption
smoothing models, the peak value for life insurance arises at age 30, yet the propensity to
own life insurance actually peaks in the late 60s (Chambers et al., 2011). In a study of life
insurance holdings by those in their 50s and early 60s, nearly half of married people “were
protected by life insurance even though they faced no underlying vulnerabilities”
(Bernheim, Fornie, Gokhale, & Kotlikoff, 2003, p. 360). In contrast, another study found that
among secondary earners in their 20s and 30s, only one-in-five “held sufficient life
insurance to avert significant or severe financial consequences” (Bernheim, Carman,
Gokhale, & Kotlikoff, 2003, p. 532). The authors summarized succinctly, “life insurance is
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essentially uncorrelated with financial vulnerability at every stage in the life cycle”
(Bernheim et al., 2003, p. 531).
Purchasing term life insurance is, in essence, pure death planning, suggesting that
contemplation of such purchases would generate mortality salience. Fransen, Fennis,
Pruyn, and Das (2008) confirmed this experimentally, finding that simply exposing
participants to a life insurance company logo increased their mortality salience. Similarly,
Rockloff, Browne, Li, and O’Shea (2014) used a question about owning a life insurance
policy to trigger mortality salience.
By the initial avoidance implication, the mortality salience feature of life insurance
would lead consumers to resist, and hence delay, the initial purchase of life insurance. Yet, if
a consumer had a long-standing policy, contemplating cancellation might also heighten
mortality salience, creating resistance and delay even when the original need had
disappeared. Separately, advancing age reduces objective longevity, s, increasing the
marginal utility of investing in future social impact, pR2XR2, such as through a life insurance
bequest, relative to other investments, pc1Xc1, pc2Xc2, or pR1XR1.
Combining the initial avoidance and symbolic immortality implications may explain
why life insurance is “sold and not bought” (Bernheim et al., 2003, p. 354). Consumers will
tend to avoid decision making that induces mortality salience, such as contemplating life
insurance purchases. However, if a salesperson were able to induce mortality salience – by
forcing contemplation of life insurance or otherwise – then the consumer’s attraction to the
bequest benefit, R2, of the product would increase. This results in a product that could be
“sold” even if, without a salesperson, it would not be “bought.” However, to the extent that
such salespeople are associated with death contemplation, the initial avoidance implication
suggests that consumers will tend to avoid them. This may explain the tendency for life
insurance agents to adopt substitute titles such as financial advisor (Rosh, 2015). Further,
it may help to explain the relative attraction of whole life products that allow for initial
discussion of non-death-related savings goals, albeit with an ancillary death-related
component, as compared with the pure death planning of term life insurance.
Charitable Gifts
Charitable gifts are one method of making investments in the circumstances of
others, such as improving others’ welfare or improving others’ opinions of the donor. The
symbolic immortality implication suggests that inducing mortality salience will increase the
marginal utility of investments in future social impact, pR2XR2, relative to current, pc1Xc1, or
future, pc2Xc2, consumption experiences. Correspondingly, experimental research has found
that death reminders increased giving and favorability toward charities that support one’s
social affiliations (Jonas, Schimel, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002) or one’s salient social
norms (Jonas, Sullivan, & Greenberg, 2013). Further, death reminders increased
satisfaction resulting from sharing money with others (Zaleskiewicz, Gasiorowska, &
Kesebir, 2015).
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The same implication suggests that inducing mortality salience will increase the
marginal utility of investments in future social impact, pR2XR2, relative to immediate social
impact, pR1XR1. Wade-Benzoni, Tost, Hernandez, and Larrick (2012) provided an
experimental test of this concept. Participants were entered into a drawing for $1,000 and
were given the opportunity to pre-commit some of their potential winnings to a charity
benefiting people in impoverished communities. Half of the participants read that the
charity was “focused on meeting the immediate needs of people in those communities.” The
other half read that the charity was “focused on creating lasting improvements that would
benefit people in those communities in the future.” Thus, the two descriptions roughly
corresponded to the R1 and R2 concepts of the proposed model. Half of those in each group
were exposed to a death reminder prior to making the charitable giving decision. For those
not exposed to a death reminder, the description focused on immediate social impact
generated a higher average gift amount ($257.77) than the description focused on lasting
improvements ($100.00), pR1XR1>pR2XR2. However, under mortality salience, the description
focused on immediate social impact generated a lower average gift amount ($80.97) than
the description focused on lasting improvements ($223.98), pR1XR1<pR2XR2. Therefore, this
result corresponds with the model’s implication that inducing mortality salience will
increase the desire for future social impact, R2, relative to immediate social impact, R1.
Separately, the popularity of charitable gift annuities, estimated to hold $15-$20
billion (Behan & Clontz, 2005) despite their low return and high risk relative to commercial
annuities, may be explained, in part, by an increased desire for future social impact, R2,
generated by the mortality salience inherent in annuity contemplation. A charitable gift
annuity allows a donor to purchase fixed lifetime payments, lower than those available for
commercial annuities, from the charity that, depending upon the state of issuance, may
have no reserves to support the payments (American Council on Gift Annuities, 2016).
Nevertheless, because any unused portion benefits the charitable organization at the death
of the annuitant, a charitable gift annuity provides the future social impact, R2, missing
from a traditional commercial annuity.2
Estate Planning
The initial avoidance implication is consistent with the underutilization of estate
planning documents. In the U.S., roughly half of adults age 55 and over have no estate
planning documents (James, 2015). If this implication is influential then using descriptions
limiting death references should increase interest, just as with annuity descriptions
(Salisbury & Nenkov, 2016). James (2016) found experimentally that avoiding extraneous
death-related terms when describing a charitable bequest gift significantly increased
interest in making such gifts.

2 The symbolic immortality implication may also explain why it is rare for a donor to either purchase
a commercial annuity with cash and donate the price difference to a charity, or to request that the charity
immediately spend the actuarial estimated residual rather than waiting for the donor’s death. As compared
with the typical charitable gift annuity, both would exchange future charitable benefit, R2, for immediate
charitable benefit, R1.
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Poterba (2001) and Kopczuk and Slemrod (2003) demonstrated that those with
taxable estates substantially underutilize the significant tax advantages of making
immediate gifts to family members in place of bequest transfers. Kopczuk and Slemrod
(2005) attributed this to “the refusal to face up to one’s mortality” (p. 19), which fits with
the initial and induced avoidance implications of the current model. In addition, estate
planning increases mortality salience, which, by the symbolic immortality implication,
increases the value of investments in future social impact, pR2XR2, such as a bequest gift to
family members, relative to investments in immediate social impact, pR1XR1, such as a
current gift to family members. This implication corresponds not only with the
underutilization of tax advantaged immediate gifts in estate planning, but also with the
common form of these transfers. In practice, taxpayers often access these tax advantages
by making current gifts to an irrevocable life insurance trust or a dynasty trust that will not
benefit the recipient until well after the donor’s death (Willms, 2000). Thus, in accordance
with the symbolic immortality implication, the taxpayer uses the tax benefit of immediate
gifting, R1, but does so in a way that generates only a future benefit to heirs, R2.
These future circumstances of others, R2, may also include others’ opinions of the
consumer even when the consumer is deceased at the future time. Such opinions
commonly relate to compliance with or violation of socially accepted norms. Thus, social
norm reminders may have a heightened importance in a mortality salient decision context
such as estate planning. Correspondingly, in the United Kingdom, Sanders, Halpern, and
Service (2013) found that inclusion of a charitable bequest increased more than three-fold
when the drafting professional included a social norm statement by mentioning, “many of
our customers like to leave money to charity in their will” (p. 22). In the United States,
James (2016) reported a similar effect for a social norm statement in the charitable bequest
context.
Conspicuous Consumption
Some goods may have benefits both from personal consumption experience and
from their effect on others. Wong (1997, p. 197) defined conspicuous consumption as a
circumstance “in which product satisfaction is derived from audience reaction rather than
utility in use.” A luxury good or socially-conscious good (e.g., those with fair trade labels or
associated charitable transfers) may be desired in part because it affects others opinions of
the consumer, or because it encourages others to adopt socially beneficial practices. The
portion of this social impact that continues into the future is a form of R2.
The symbolic immortality implication suggests that mortality salience will shift
preferences toward those products with elements of desirable future social impact, R2,
relative to those products with only personal consumption characteristics, c1 and c2.
Accordingly, Kasser and Sheldon (2000) found that mortality salience increased plans to
purchase luxury products in the future. Others have found that mortality salience increased
the desire for luxury products – Lexus car, Jaguar car, Rolex watch, famously expensive
sweets, or other luxury brands – but not for products without such features – economy car,
potato chips, or non-luxury brands (Heine, Harihara, & Niiya, 2002; Mandel & Heine, 1999;
van Bommel, O'Dwyer, Zuidgeest, & Poletiek, 2015).
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The same effect can be seen for socially-conscious purchases. Mortality salience,
when combined with reminders of pro-environmental social norms, increased the desire
for an environmentally-friendly vehicle, Toyota Prius, and an environmentally-friendly
reusable cup while decreasing the desire for a less environmentally-friendly vehicle, Ford
Expedition, and a less environmentally-friendly disposable cup (Fritsche, Jonas, Kayser, &
Koranyi, 2010). Maheswaran and Agrawal (2004) suggested that in consumer purchase
decisions, “when mortality is salient, people are more willing to act in concert with the
opinions of others” (p. 214). Thus with both luxury and environmentally-friendly products,
the opinions of others – an example of a characteristic of others that can persist in the
future even without the consumer’s survival (i.e., R2) – becomes more important as the
result of inducing mortality salience.
End-Of-Life Healthcare Spending
Given that the majority of health care costs arise in the final year of life, advance
medical directives could have a dramatic impact on survivor financial circumstances, as
well as the fulfillment of patient desires (Horn & Meulen, 2014). Despite this potential
impact, and free availability from medical care providers, only about 8% to 17% of adults
over age 65 have advance directives (Musa, Seymour, Narayanasamy, Wada, & Conroy,
2015). The underutilization of advance directives is consistent with the mortality-salience
avoidance implications of the current approach.
If the avoidance implications are relevant, then de-emphasizing death-focused
language should be useful. Experimental research has found such framing to be influential
not only in death-related financial decisions, such as annuities (Salisbury & Nenkov, 2016)
and charitable bequests (James, 2016), but also in medical decisions. For example, people
are more willing to accept a treatment presented as having a 90% chance of survival than
one presented as having a 10% chance of death (McNeil, Pauker, Sox, & Tversky, 1982).
Accordingly, Payne, Prentice-Dunn, and Allen (2009) found that a more death-focused,
threatening intervention was less successful in generating completed advance directives
than a positive intervention encouraging healthy aging. Discomfort with personal mortality
can also lead healthcare workers to avoid broaching end-of-life planning discussions, with
potentially serious negative consequences for the patient (Morrison, Morrison, & Glickman,
1994; Volandes, 2015). Peck (2009) found that oncology social workers with greater death
anxiety were less likely to communicate with patients about advance directives.
Contrary to those who support advance directives, Jaworska (1999) presents an
objection based upon the inability of the current self to predict the future self’s preferences.
Such an objection actually corresponds with the current model, which suggests that
preferences will change as objective longevity, s, falls. Specifically, exogenous reductions in
objective survival, s, should generate increased investment in longevity, psXs, death denial,
pdXd, and/or future social impact, pR2XR2. The increased willingness to invest in longevityrelated healthcare, psXs, corresponds with results from Matsuyama, Reddy, and Smith
(2006) who found that those actually facing the end of life were much more likely to choose
extreme treatment options with small benefits than were well persons making similar
decisions. Tsevat et al.’s (1998) finding also reflects a relatively high desire for increased
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longevity at the end of life; among patients aged 80 years or more who were currently in
the hospital, over two-thirds were unwilling to trade even 10% of life expectancy in
exchange for excellent health. Even when treatments lose their objective medical efficacy,
they may still have value in generating false hope, or death denial. This desire for investing
in false hope, pdXd, may help to explain Emanuel and colleagues’ (2003) finding that
Medicaid patients nearing the end of life were just as likely to use chemotherapy whether
or not their type of cancer was considered responsive or unresponsive to chemotherapy.
Separately, the current approach suggests an increased desire for investments in
future impact on others, pR2XR2, resulting from diminished longevity. This is consistent with
evidence that a terminal diagnosis can lead to a rapid shift in personal attitudes and values
to become more other-centered, including increases in empathy, forgiveness, helping,
compassion, and social bonding (Vail et al., 2012; Yalom, 2015). Of course, aging also
reduces life expectancy. Correspondingly, Schoklitsch and Baumann (2012) observed that
generativity or “the concern in establishing and guiding the next generation” is a
particularly important focus at older ages (p. 262).
Health Promotion Using Mortality Risk
In a simple rational approach, a health promotion campaign emphasizing mortality
risk should generate immediate behavioral adjustments that enhance consumer welfare
and longevity. However, acting on this information requires the consumer to accept his or
her own personal mortality risk. Such acceptance runs counter to maintaining death denial,
d. Thus, in response to the mortality salience generated by the death-focused campaign, the
consumer could pursue longevity, s, at the cost of diminished death denial, d, or vice-versa.
The choice to pursue death denial is seen in examples such as people responding to
information about health risks by engaging in consumption, such as drinking, designed to
dull the awareness of the health risk (Leventhal, 1970), or refusing to learn of their HIV
status, specifically citing the desire to avoid the resulting psychological distress (Lyter,
Valdiserri, Kingsley, Amoroso, & Rinaldo, 1987).
The choice of which path to pursue, investing in either psXs or pdXd, will depend upon
the perceived cost structure for acquiring each. Accordingly, Arndt, Routledge, and
Goldenberg (2006) found that among women who strongly believed they could influence
their health, death reminders increased intentions to engage in breast self-examination for
cancer detection. But, among those who had low expectations of their ability to influence
their health, death reminders reduced these same intentions. More generally, Witte and
Allen (2000), in a meta-analysis of public health campaigns, found that stronger (commonly
more mortality salient) fear appeals were simultaneously more likely to produce healthpromoting behavior and were also more likely to produce defensiveness. The determining
factor influencing the choice of response was the consumer’s perceived efficacy in
improving the health outcome with behavior change (Witte & Allen, 2000). In the current
model this perceived efficacy is represented as the perceived cost structure for psXs.
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Thus, health promotion campaigns highlighting mortality risk may consider
including information on the efficacy and ease of the proposed behavior change – unless
the behavior is self-evidently easy (Kareklas & Muehling, 2014) – or alternatively, adding
non-death related motivations (e.g., “smoking is disgusting” instead of “smoking kills”). Of
course, avoidance does not require denying mortality risks that don’t apply to one’s self.
This fits with experimental results finding that people are more likely to challenge the
accuracy of negative medical information if it applies to their behavior (Kunda, 1987), or
suggests that they are at risk (Jemmott, Ditto, & Croyle, 1986), than if it does not.
Other Personal Financial Behaviors
The proposed economic model has the potential to inform personal financial
behaviors in other areas. For example, Ameriks and associates (2015) identified a “longterm care insurance puzzle” where people hold far less insurance for nursing home
treatment than is economically justified. However, to the extent that contemplating future
nursing home residency triggers mortality salience, the current approach would predict
this kind of avoidance behavior. Similarly, the relatively low level of participation in prepaid funeral plans (Hickey & Quinn, 2012) is unsurprising. In retirement spending, the
current approach would suggest a particular attraction to spending no more than current
income (from assets or otherwise), as this is the highest level of spending that does not
require contemplation of the timing of one’s own death.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL ADVISORS AND FINANCIAL THERAPY
Financial therapy is a field that has grown from the intersection of diverse
disciplines exploring personal finance, psychological functioning, and personal and family
well-being. It promotes the idea that a cross-disciplinary approach can yield meaningful
insights and useful practices. The proposed economic model of phenomena previously
described in exclusively psychological terms demonstrates how such a cross-disciplinary
approach can generate a remarkably wide range of potentially useful implications.
Specifically, if many apparently disparate decisions involve a common framework when
mortality is salient, then similar interventions may be effective across different
applications. For example, attempts to promote estate planning may be informed by
experiments with annuities, life insurance, advance directives, anti-smoking campaigns,
long-term care insurance, death-related medical decisions, or even conspicuous
consumption (and vice-versa). Such a radically cross-topical approach to addressing
individual, ostensibly narrow, issues demonstrates the potential value of the
multidisciplinary ethos of financial therapy. Beyond understanding the underlying
connectedness of a wide range of decisions that either generate or respond to mortality
salience, the proposed model generates specific suggestions for the practice of financial
advising and financial therapy.
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Manage Death Avoidance with Framing
The avoidance implications suggest that many people will prefer to avoid personal
mortality reminders, especially when mortality is salient. This can cause clients to
inappropriately avoid or postpone important death-related planning. In some cases, the
advisor may be complicit in such avoidance either because the topic is personally aversive
to the advisor or because the advisor wishes to avoid clients’ negative reactions.
A simple step to managing this avoidance response is to reduce death-focused
language when describing desirable planning options. Reframing such options with
alternate language (e.g., “as long as you live” instead of “until you die”) has consistently
increased the attractiveness of options whether in annuities (Salisbury & Nenkov, 2016),
estate planning (James, 2016), or healthcare decisions (McNeil, Pauker, Sox, & Tversky,
1982).
Where a death-focused planning discussion is necessary, creating the opportunity
for such a conversation may be easier if the overall topic of discussion is not exclusively
death-focused. Thus, the possibility of such a discussion may meet with greater acceptance
if the advisor does not “lead with death.” Broader financial topics (e.g., avoiding taxes,
providing for a child’s college education, planning an ideal retirement) may function as less
aversive introductions to death-related topics (e.g., estate tax planning, life insurance to
protect college funding, annuities). Such an approach can sidestep the initial avoidance
response that might otherwise prevent the conversation from occurring at all.
Anticipate the Heightened Importance of Social Impact
When engaging in death-related planning topics, advisors may anticipate an
increased interest in impact on important others, particularly long-lasting or future impact.
Thus, advisors could frame desirable planning options to emphasize these features.
Complex estate planning, such as dynasty trusts, spendthrift trusts, or family foundations,
can be presented as a way to achieve a long-term future impact for the family or other
important beneficiaries. Annuities may be presented as protecting a bequest of other assets
from unexpected longevity, rather than simply protecting one’s lifetime income at the
expense of the heirs.
Additionally, social opinions, including social norms, become particularly significant
in the mortality salient context as shown in experiments with consumer purchases
(Fritsche et al., 2010), charitable giving (Jonas et al., 2013), and estate planning (James,
2016; Sanders et al., 2013). Thus, describing what is normal, typical, or approved among
similar others can be influential. Likewise, defaults may be powerful in this context as they
provide both a cue of social norms (important in the symbolic immortality implication) and
a simple mechanism to make an immediate choice that avoids further contemplation of the
death-related topic (important in the avoidance implications). As an example of the power
of defaults in a death-related context, Johnson and Goldstein (2003) found that effective
national consent rates to organ donations varied from 4%-27% when the default choice
was “no,” but were over 99% when the default choice was “yes.”
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Appreciate the Value of Third Party Agency
The avoidance response may cause clients to postpone or resist important financial
planning components that require contemplation of personal mortality. However, this
avoidance reaction applies to contemplation of one’s own mortality, not to contemplation
of another’s mortality (when such thoughts do not create personal mortality salience). In
this way, a third-party advisor may be a more objective and effective decision-maker for
the client simply because the advisor is not the client. Thus, when an intermediary can act
as agent for mortality salient decisions, the client may experience preferred outcomes
without the negative utility impact from personal mortality salience. Even where such
agency is not possible, an intermediary or advisor may rephrase or reframe a decision in
order to reduce mortality salience, and hence reduce any negative consequences from an
avoidance response.
Future Research
Given the wide range of potential applications of the approach, the proposed
implications remain untested in many contexts. Future testing of concepts consistent with
this economic approach may be both practically helpful and informative as to the validity of
the concept in a wider range of circumstances. Although it does not encompass the wide
range of explanations, mechanisms, and motivations encompassed by TMT, the proposed
simple economic approach may prove to have substantial explanatory power for a diverse
range of decisions.
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